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Religion and Realpolitik: Reflections on Sacrifice 
Carolyn Marvin 
Annenberg School for Communication 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Enduring groups that seek to preserve themselves, as sacred communities do, face a structural 
contradiction between the interests of individual group members and the survival interests of the group. In 
addressing existential threats, sacred communities rely on a spectrum of coercive and violent actions that 
resolve this contradiction in favor of solidarity. Despite different histories, this article argues, nationalism 
and religiosity are most powerfully organized as sacred communities in which sacred violence is extracted 
as sacrifice from community members. The exception is enduring groups that are able to rely on the 
protection of other violence practicing groups. The argument rejects functionalist claims that sacrifice 
guarantees solidarity or survival, since sacrificing groups regularly fail. In a rereading of Durkheim’s 
totem taboo, it is argued that sacred communities cannot survive a permanent loss of sacrificial assent on 
the part of members. Producing this assent is the work of ritual socialization. The deployment of 
sacrificial violence on behalf of group survival, though deeply sobering, is best constrained by 
recognizing how violence holds sacred communities in thrall rather than by denying the links between 
them. 
 
Keywords:  sacred community, religious violence, sacrifice, totem, solidarity 
 
At Dartmouth College, the site of this conference on religious violence, 
twenty-four murals in the Baker Library depict the Mexican muralist José Orozco’s 
rendering of the saga of American civilization. Near the beginning of the series, a 
panel called “Ancient Human Sacrifice” portrays the Aztec ceremony of slicing the 
heart from a live ritual victim. The victim’s limbs, arranged in a perfect X centered 
on his soon to be excised organ, recall with a shock of recognition, the first page of 
the Mendoza Codex, a compendium of Aztec history produced twenty years after 
the Conquest by indigenous scribes. The same page conveys the founding legend 
of the Aztec capital city Tehnochtitlan. It images two waterways rendered in the 
shape of a St. Andrew’s cross converging on an eagle perched on a blooming 
cactus sprung from a rock. 
 
By legend the god Huitzilopochtli led the Mexica to a marshy islet in Lake 
Texcoco where the ripped out heart of his murdered rival had taken root in a 
flowering prickly pear on which a giant eagle rested. This, the Mexica were 
instructed, was the site of Tenochtitlan. Scholars say the eagle signifies 
Huitzilopochtli’s hunger for the human hearts that fuel his daily journey across the 
firmament. The mortal heart of his rival, in turn, is the founding sacrifice of the 
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city where human hearts were surrendered to the god. Thus does Orozco analogize 
violent sacrifice to the iconic symbol (an eagle-cactus-rock glyph plus a serpent 
signifying the man-god Quetzalcoatl) of modern Mexico.  
 
Toward the end of the series, another panel “Modern Sacrifice” depicts an 
elaborate flag-draped bier flanked with memorial wreaths bearing another 
sacrificial victim, this time to nationalist dreams. In these panels Orozco links an 
ancient religious rite to the modern religion of nationalism. His epic of America is 
a theme of continuous sacrifice, the ritual axis around which the founding, memory 
and renewal of a people revolves
1
. Orozco’s evocation of group sacrifice as a 
historical constant visually mirrors my own understanding of how religion and 
sacrifice are related, and how religious violence is related to national sacrifice in 
particular.   
This perspective contrasts with those of several conference participants who 
question whether, in the first place, the term religion comprises any compelling 
empirical referents for analysis.  To those who doubt it, religious violence as a 
subcategory of religion is so confounded with other sources of human motivation 
as to be a nearly meaningless analytical term. A different and somewhat 
contradictory perspective argues that religious violence by definition perverts the 
true nature of religion and, when it seems to occur, proceeds from something 
besides religion itself. Though these viewpoints are contradictory to one another, 
both serve a deeply felt and widespread belief that violence can never be a genuine 
attribute of religion. 
 
Both positions belong, at least by tendency, to the book that is the occasion 
for this conference, William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence
2
. 
Cavanaugh suggests that Western nationalism has projected its own violent visage 
on the face of religious history. Insofar as Cavanaugh means to argue that religion 
is not easily distinguished from secular life, I agree, having myself argued for their 
overlap in my book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation,
3
 from which Cavanaugh 
quotes. My inference from this fact departs from Cavanaugh’s, however (though I 
would argue he never explicitly disagrees with the position I articulate in Blood 
Sacrifice), and from the position of political theorists such as Ernest Gellner for 
whom modernity is defined by the triumph of the secular over the religious.  
 
                                                          
1
 Quetzalcoatl, bringer of a Golden Age to the Aztecs, is depicted as an exception who banishes sacrifice, but he is 
also tragically banished and the Golden Age lost. 
2
 The Myth of Religious Violence 
3
 With David Ingle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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I propose that prevailing notions of religious phenomena are not too wide, 
but too narrow, especially where nationalism is concerned. They fail to recognize 
that so-called secular modern states are religious down to the bone, though both 
leaders and citizens often deny it even as they organize the killing energies that 
define them.
4
 
 
Defining Religion 
  
That some aspects of the binary divide between secular and religious 
practice have been strained to the point of collapse seems a consensus position 
among all conference participants, myself included. What is very much at issue are 
its implications. A collapse of the binary might acknowledge the absence of a fixed 
line between the religious and the secular, expanding backwards the range of what 
can be considered secular, and forward, the range of what is considered religious. 
But the impulse to disqualify religion altogether as a category of analysis suggests 
that a deeper purpose of the religious-secular binary itself was always to insulate 
religion, considered by some to be a category of the divine and by others the 
accumulated moral wisdom of tradition, from possessing morally questionable, 
which is to say violent, social impulses. In a political environment in which 
differences among some contemporary persons of faith have become categories of 
political condemnation, removing religion as a valid category for analysis makes it 
possible to avoid uncomfortable questions about the broader relationship of 
violence to religious phenomena more generally.  
 
My sense of the inadequacy of the religious-secular binary strains in a 
different direction, however. As I see it, questioning the binary helps us recognize 
the fundamentally religious structuration of the nation-state. The sacrificial politics 
of the modern nation-state, on which co-nationals stake the lives of their children, 
their friends, and themselves, may suggest (and I will argue) that the problem of 
violence is not that it is a feature of religion as such, but that it is a fundamental 
processes of enduring groups generally, of which religious groups are exemplary 
cases.  
 
That the term religion has emerged relatively recently to describe human 
activity is thought by some to disqualify what it refers to as a universal 
phenomenon of human societies generally. If new historical circumstances have 
forced to the surface a consciousness of religion as a phenomenon that may be 
                                                          
4 Ibid., pp. 1, 205. See also pp. 313-315. 
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compared with other forms of life, this does not disqualify it as a descriptor of 
certain long-standing features of group practice. The discursive novelty of religion, 
relatively speaking, draws our interest to the timing and causes of its emergence as 
a focus of self-reflection. This is not to claim that religion is a natural social kind, 
but to acknowledge our need for vocabulary and concepts for social processes and 
systems that, though variable and instantiated in a variety of contexts, share a 
family resemblance, in this case with long-standing experiences of group 
preservation manifest in elaborated practices of communal devotion.  
 
In this paper I will use religion both loosely and contradictorily in order to 
acknowledge the confessional lens through which most contemporary Americans 
think about it, and in a specific analytic sense as (1) a field characterized by 
communities of believers (2) that form around and cultivate the self-sacrifice of 
members at various intensities of mutual commitment up to and including death 
(which may be social as well as physical) (3) to achieve the goal specified in the 
group's origin myth, which includes group survival. In this definition I mean to 
encompass that which bounded groups take to be so undeniably true that they will 
kill and sacrifice in its name to demonstrate and secure the preservation of notions 
that so fundamentally define them. I treat religious and enduring as sociologically 
synonymous, since religious devotion is what is characteristic of enduring groups. 
In this view, the emergence of Western nationalism is a recognizably religious 
response—characterized by new modes of belief and practice—to a constellation 
of modernizing developments that historically challenged the great axial religious 
traditions that organized generations of pre-modern populations.  
 
I define modernity in the Gellnerian sense as the (uneven) growth of 
economic specialization and interdependency based on new technologies of 
transport, material production, and communication from the sixteenth century 
forward that reset the conditions of group life on a scale that transformed 
traditional social relationships. My definition of religion focuses on how enduring 
groups persuade their members to sacrifice for the common good. My definition 
does not focus on the content or presumed moral worth of religious doctrines. Such 
accounts of how rather than that groups elicit sacrificial devotion are missing in 
most analyses of nationalism (and pre-modern histories as well, but see Inga 
Clendinnen’s interpretation of Aztec culture
5
). 
 
Such an approach may be seen as functionalist, which for some will raise a 
theoretical flag. In my view, conventional critiques of functionalism misconstrue 
                                                          
5
 Inga Clendinnen, The Aztecs: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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the Durkheimian formula in which religion renews the collective representations of 
the tribe and affirms its common sentiments.
6
 A familiar criticism takes this to 
mean that mere ritual performance has the capacity to create solidarity.
 7
  But 
nothing in the Durkheimian oeuvre suggests that ritual performance never fails in 
its effectivity. While some neo-Durkheimians have indeed presumed an automatic 
effect for ritual performance,
8
 others such as Clifford Geertz
9
 and Bruce Kapferer 
have acknowledged and examined ritual failures in depth. My own work examines 
the conditions in which rituals of American nationalism fail and succeed. An 
available analogy is that groups conduct war in order to win, but not all wars are 
won by those who conduct them. Scholars have long acknowledged that ritual 
functions extend beyond group solidarity and include, among other things, displays 
of power, status transformation, and transmitting group memory. Nor has neo-
Durkheimian theory itself been invariably functionalist. Roy Rappaport has 
powerfully shifted the conversation from solidarity to the commissives, or public 
promises, to which ritual performatives contingently give rise.
10
 This work is 
highly suggestive for considering the relationship between religion and violence. 
 
Finally, let me wrestle with the most obvious objection to the definition of 
religion I have proposed. It seems to disqualify ordinary religious practice and 
devotion, especially in the West, to the extent that these fall short of something like 
willing martyrdom. What it does capture is what Scott Appleby calls "militant" 
religion in his taxonomic categorization of the varieties of religious experience and 
devotion. Appleby's taxonomy addresses the range of self-descriptive claims on 
offer by those who count themselves believers. I am happy to acknowledge that the 
nationalist strain of religion I examine here falls under the category of "militant." 
Nonetheless, I argue that all religious doctrines consider, however indirectly, 
foundational concerns of life and death within a collective framework of 
devotional practice. This allows me to explore devotional practices that place life 
and death problems front and center, unvarnished and undiluted.  These are the 
practices lie at the core of the relationship between devotion and violence. 
 
Religion and Violence 
 
                                                          
6
 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 1913 a unified set of beliefs and practices relative to 
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, - beliefs and practices which unite [into] one single 
moral community, all those who adhere to them (Durkheim [1915] 1964: 37 cited in Morris 1987). 
7
 Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social Integration” Sociology 1975 ( 9), 289-308. 
8
 The classic case is Edward Shils and Michael Young, ”The Meaning of the Coronation,” Sociological Review NS (1) 
1953, pp. 63-82.  
9
 Clifford Geertz, “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example,” American Anthropologist 59 (1957), pp. 32-54. 
10
 Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Though deplored as a failure of diplomacy and morals, violence is a well 
established strategy of enduring groups that compete for dominance
11
. E. O. 
Wilson, David Sloan Wilson and others have recently proposed that group 
competition is at least as powerful as gene competition as a selection (for E. O. 
Wilson the major selection) factor in evolution,
12
 For political theorist Carl Schmitt 
group competition is culturally manifest in the fierce division between friends and 
enemies. Following Leibniz, Schmitt describes the rhetoric of the modern nation-
state as “political theology”,
13
 acknowledging that “in case of need, the political 
entity must demand the sacrifice of life.”
14
 Regrettably, Schmitt does not elaborate 
how groups manage to persuade individuals to sacrifice flesh and blood for group 
goals. Nor has E.O. Wilson done this. The closest Durkheim came was describing 
the “collective effervescence” of tribalism, also without accounting for its 
dynamics.
15
)   
 
Building on Roy Rappaport’s analysis of how social commissives are 
established by ritual,
 16
  I propose that ritual resolves the ethical contradiction that 
pits long term group interests against the immediate survival of individuals.  
Pursuing their own preservation, competing groups formulate a program of 
protective force manifest in the willing submission of group members to an ethic of 
sacrifice.
17
 Three sorts of violence,
18
 roughly speaking, characterize rituals of 
group competition. These are: (1) the use of force against internal enemies to 
protect group interests (2) the use of force against external enemies on behalf of 
group interests (3) voluntary self-sacrifice by group members on behalf of group 
interests. All qualify as cooperative and altruistic behaviors in the service of a 
“parochial altruism”
19
 primed to incite hostility toward outgroups.  
                                                          
11
 Enduring groups are multigenerational groups committed to what E.O. Wilson has called “defense of the nest”, 
here understood as a definable territory, a population defined by a mission, or both, accompanied by  organized 
specialization of labor to meet the material and social needs of group members. This is a modified version of 
criteria Wilson adduces to define tribes in The Social Conquest of Earth (2012). 
12
 See Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth (Liveright, 2012) and David Sloan Wilson, Darwin's Cathedral 
13
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (1934; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), trans. George Schwab, p. 37. 
14
 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, expanded edition, trans. by George Schwab (1932; Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 71.  
15
 He gives considerable attention to the totem taboo about which members of the clan agree not to disagree 
without ever exploring the content of that agreement, which I argue is group willingness to sacrifice group 
members. Marvin and Ingle, pp. FIND THIS 
16
 Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
pp. 26-30, 391-396. 
17
 The umbrella of group protection may extend beyond the immediate group to allies on whose behalf the 
primary group acts—e.g., the dependence of NATO or Canada on the dominant military power of the U.S. 
18
 Defined as the amount of force necessary to compel someone to do something against their will 
19
 Jung-Kyoo Choi and Samuel Bowles, “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War,” Science, vol. 318, Oct. 26, 
2007, pp. 636-640 
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The business of a successful tribe is to engineer this coercion and extract 
these sacrifices with the aim of cultivating a reserve of obligation that can be 
tapped in the face of perceived existential threats  (the accuracy of the perception is 
not at issue, only the perception itself). A strategy that creates  either internal or 
external scapegoats—enemies—to  assuage intolerable group anxiety
 
 may come at 
devastating cost to those who execute it or are its targets.
 20
 This cost is always 
measured against and justified by the specter of collective disintegration. Even if 
group strengthening is sacrifice’s animating motive, not all sacrifice succeeds.  
What makes a given sacrifice legitimate and potentially unifying to group members 
is the conviction that it is voluntary and fairly shared out. Pains are taken to 
conceal, minimize and justify sacrificial elements that fall short of these standards 
of devotion, but such adjustments may reduce and even eliminate their power to 
unify.  
 
 
 
 
Religious Mobilization of Group Assent 
 
I have argued that the resolution of conflicting group and individual interests 
is achieved in the religious mobilization of group assent. Recall once more my 
definition of religion as a ritual vehicle that links bodies to gestures and discourses 
that instantiate social obligation. To effect the survival task established in a group 
origin myth, rituals cultivate the committed self-sacrifice of members at different 
                                                          
20
 Vivid examples of scapegoating include the disproportionate incarceration and execution of black males in the 
United States since Reconstruction from lynching and Jim Crow to state-sponsored capital punishment.
20
 A more 
visibly religious case is the shielding by certain ultra-Orthodox communities in New York City of ultra-Orthodox 
child molesters by coercing the silence of some victims and their families so as to avoid the fracture of group 
integrity on the part of secular authorities: 
Some ultra-Orthodox Jews want to keep abuse allegations quiet to protect the reputation of the 
community…And rabbinical authorities, eager to maintain control, worry that inviting outside scrutiny 
could erode their power, said Samuel Heilman, a professor of Jewish studies at Queens College. 
        “They are more afraid of the outside world than the deviants within their own community,” Dr. 
[Samuel} Heilman [a professor of Jewish studies at Queens College] said. “The deviants threaten 
individuals here or there, but the outside world threatens everyone and the entire structure of their 
world.” Sharon Otterson and Ray Rivera, “Ultra-Orthodox Shun Their Own for Reporting Child Abuse,” 
New York Times, May 19, 2012.  
Procrastinations and denials in the Catholic priest pedophilia scandal reflect a similar group-protective reflex by 
church officials. However, the church is subject to the jurisdiction of political authority, the relevant community 
with enduring group responsibilities. The sacrifice of children in the interest of survival is common in group 
sacrifice. More easily seen as legitimate than intra-group sacrifice by Catholics and Hasidim is the broad based 
sacrifice of soldiers—but only in popular wars (wars to which, by definition, such sacrifice is broadly consented to)! 
Poignantly, soldiers are typically young and always the children of citizens. 
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levels of devotion up to and including death. Death is not the only worthy 
devotional practice, but religious commitment is often measured by the willingness 
of individuals to die for the myth. It may be national or religious so long as it 
establishes what is required for the survival of the group and its mission.   
 
Granted, this omits those conventionally religious groups in the West for 
which few members would willingly sacrifice their lives today. The history of 
modern warfare suggests that, in the face of serious group threat, many of these 
members will rapidly move to place themselves under the protection of a 
nationalism that does ask some group members to sacrifice themselves. At any 
historical moment, the worthiness of the request is a pressing and legitimate 
debate.  This makes the point that religion—confessional or national—is, for the 
purposes of this argument, less a carrier of noble doctrines than a strategy of 
mobilization for group preservation. That strategy is very much served by noble 
doctrines of cooperation in combination with prescribed gestures of ritual devotion. 
This is not a cynical observation. Notions of goodness are regularly anchored in 
group ideals of cooperation, consensus and sacrifice. Their power is captured in 
Clifford Geertz’s well known dictum that religion acts to “…(2) establish 
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic.”
21
 In this context, virtue is amically determined. (An 
analytic disposition to resist universal notions of religion may be contrasted with 
its logical obverse—the less controversial disposition to invoke trans-group ethical 
standards condemning violence wherever it is found.) 
 
Why do I insist that violence (and its paler shadow, non-violent group 
coercion), a social action many contemporary faiths reject unequivocally, is 
religiously foundational? Because humans want to believe that the lives of group 
members can be sacrificed, whether willingly or by coercion, for an ultimate truth 
only. It is no great step from this to the belief, commonly articulated in religious 
rhetoric, that what we are willing to sacrifice our bodies for must, therefore, be the 
truth. Sectarian religion and nationalism are parallel communities of faith since the 
true object of worship in each case is the entity to whom legitimate authority to kill 
is morally assigned. By this reasoning, nationalism may be understood as the 
ascendant faith of our historical moment.  Some who are reluctant to acknowledge 
the killing authority of so-called secular powers are willing to invest God with the 
                                                          
21
 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” Anthropological Approaches to the  Study of Religion. M. Banton, 
ed.,  (London: Tavistock XLII, 1985), p. 176. 
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right to “take” souls, as the saying goes.  The foundation of the Christian message 
is, of course, a son willing to die for the eternal preservation of the father’s other 
children. Even believers often make practical peace with the killing authority of the 
nation-state in principle, while particular circumstances for properly exercising it 
remain up for debate. There are also national communities in which killing 
authority is seamlessly shared between God and a nation that is said to act on God's 
behalf. Those who fear the fervor of confessionally mandated killing and self-
sacrifice may sometimes fail to recognize the ways that similar mythic mechanisms 
authorize self-sacrifice within their own national groups.  
 
Among the attributes shared by national and confessional groups we may 
count the following
22
: 
 
1. Origin myths that situate believers in the cosmos and offer consolation for 
the most wrenching human tragedies, especially mortality. 
2. Primary social bonds expressed in ritual obligations that connect 
community members to one another and to an origin myth of a transcendental 
group purpose. 
3. Explicit forms of participation that establish grounds for group 
membership. 
4. Doctrines of correct belief and commandments of duty and devotion 
including self-sacrifice.  
 
That enduring groups are authorized to command and take human life, 
effort, and treasure when group survival requires it, are what Schmitt and 
Agamben
23
 call the state of exception. This does not mean killing authority 
exercises its power absent criticism or objection from believers. It means that 
sovereign authority is vested only in that entity that undertakes to guarantee group 
survival, in this case, the nation or group deity. While treating violence as a failure 
of moral imagination, liberal philosophy fails to address how enduring groups can 
persist absent the option to act with force against existential threats. Even those 
who believe violence is always morally wrong rarely condemn non-violent self-
sacrifice. Since non-violence often turns out to be most potent when it provokes a 
violent response from antagonists, those who deploy non-violence logically share 
responsibility for whatever violent response it may inspire.  
 
                                                          
22
 Adapted from Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, p. 16. 
23
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, 1998). 
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Examining the historiography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Cavanaugh argues that instead of being the solution to religious wars, the liberal 
state actively instigated or was complicit in wars mislabeled as religiously 
motivated. As he sees it, the self-deceiving conclusion that the liberal nation-state 
is the solution to religious violence is enshrined in the triumphalist creation myth 
of modern Western societies, and this myth has long been used to justify Western 
military intervention, most recently in the Middle East. 
When we do try to justify violence, we often cast it, reluctantly, as a political 
necessity in a fallen world or as a failure of diplomacy and morals, rather than 
theorizing it as a strategy of persisting social groups asserting their interests in 
order to survive and prosper over long periods, as national and religious groups do. 
(Such groups are characterized as eusocial by the evolutionary biologist E. O. 
Wilson The Social Conquest of the Earth (Liveright, 2012). They are 
multigenerational, characterized by defense of the nest, and the specialization of 
reproductive and defensive labor.) 
It may be more helpful to regard violence as a shocking but unavoidable 
feature of the social cooperation that is necessary for group survival. Abstractly 
defined, cooperation is a strategy of working consensually toward common ends. 
Our most optimistic notions of cooperation envision approximately equal efforts 
by willing collaborators. This is a quality of much cooperation, and fine as far as it 
goes. But some forms of cooperation involve very unequal contributions of time, 
talent, and treasure among collaborators, up to and including the death or 
impairment of some members of the group to serve its larger good. Through this 
lens, violence experienced within the group or perpetrated on outsiders is the 
dramatic, physically coercive assertion of the perceived survival interests of a 
group or tribe against whoever resists those interests, including reluctant members 
within the group.  Cooperation—a collective undertaking for the ultimate purpose 
of enduring generationally—requires significant sacrifice, variously voluntary and 
compelled, and sometimes violently enacted.  
The negotiation of that sacrifice is always political. This is because sacrifice 
is often not in the immediate interest of those doing the sacrificing (hewing to a 
fundamental definition of sacrifice as the maintenance of the conditions of group 
existence by a propitiatory offering that requires alienating something of value to 
the sacrificer), however much it may be in the long term interest of the group.  The 
business of a successful group is nonetheless to extract these sacrifices by creating 
11 
 
strong and weak ties that provide conditions for daily flourishing and a reserve of 
collective commitment to draw on when existential threats loom.
24
 
The discussion suggests a sinister dimension to collective survival within 
groups, never mind outside them. Some sacrifices may indeed come at devastating 
expense to some group members, as when scapegoats are feverishly sacrificed to 
assuage intolerable group anxiety. (Some would count the disproportionate 
incarceration and execution of African-American men in the United States since 
Reconstruction in this category, whether by lynching or capital punishment.) When 
violent coercion is internally exercised for sacrificial ends, pains are taken to 
conceal, minimize and justify it (rarely in self-consciously conspiratorial terms 
given broad collective support for denying the ethical quandary of sacrificing 
members the group exists to protect in the interest of group harmony and survival). 
That individuals cannot survive at all outside group protection sets up an inevitable 
ethical conflict between individual and group interests that will, in the end, be 
resolved in the perceived interest of the group if the latter is to flourish. 
In pursuit of generational viability, group rhetoric treats all cooperation as a 
win-win at both individual and tribal levels regardless of how sacrificial effort is 
distributed. Such rhetoric is not framed as an emotionally and morally deflated  
cost benefit-analysis with respect to that distribution, though such considerations 
are  present. Those who embody group moral and political authority proffer a tribal 
notion of the group as embodying a purpose larger than any single member. In the 
name of this purpose, cultivated and reinforced in ritual (focusing shared attention, 
establishing obligation to a group goal and presuming shared sentiment)
25
 (Wilson 
(2012), p. 228), willing sacrifice is elicited from those who must be persuaded, 
converted or, if absolutely necessary, intimidated and coerced—whatever it takes. 
The more visible the level of coercion, however, the more shared sentiment about 
goals is brought into question, and the less effective the exercise in the service of 
group bonding. For this reason much energy goes into rehearsing and socializing 
the foundational myths and logics of group persistence from early in the lives of 
group members. This continuing cultivation in members of an obligation to the 
group is a religious exercise at its core, buttressed by demonstrably religious 
                                                          
24
  It is not necessary for everyone to believe all the time in this metaphysical sovereignty of the national group, 
anymore than it is necessary for everyone to believe all the time in the metaphysical divinity of the religious group. 
All that is important is that when the crisis comes, that religious and citizen believers are willing to make the 
necessary effort on behalf of the group to keep it alive. If they are not willing, the religion or nation will die. Even if 
such efforts do not issue in immediate worldly victory, though it is of course better if they do, the group will not 
necessarily cease to be. Enduring groups who keep the faith alive can last a long time as fellowships of believers 
bereft of homeland or the granted privilege to worship. What kills nations and religions is when their believers 
simply become indifferent or desert the cause. 
25
 Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth, p. 228. 
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language and symbolism. Patriots and religious believers are, in this light, different 
blooms on the same tree of group flourishing. 
National and confessional groups alike embody transcendental, sacred 
purposes narrativized in creation myths discursively rehearsed, ritually performed, 
updated to encompass unfolding events, and interpreted to instantiate a mythical 
history in which founding heroes are the originators, and contemporary figurers the 
bearers of group values and purposes. What Cavanaugh calls the creation myth of 
national groups is the collapse of real and invented history into an account of why 
a given group embodies a righteous claim to killing authority compared to groups 
that preceded them and competitors they face in the struggle for dominance.   
Though modern human beings belong to multiple groups that redound to 
their benefit, survival requires some level of membership in at least one primary 
group that takes responsibility for defending the (territorial) group nest and its 
members. Technological advances in communication and transportation have 
enabled primary groups once limited to bands of hunter-gatherers to manifest as 
large-scale primary groups sheltering smaller groups that consent to the primary 
group’s Weberian monopoly on violence (or alliance with those who exercise this 
monopoly, as Europe in the case of NATO submits to the U.S.). Larger group size 
increases the possibilities for functional specialization among members, so that a 
smaller percentage of citizens have to be concerned with defending borders and the 
rest can get on with other aspects of the collective business of group flourishing. 
In the contemporary world, such groups are usually nations, and their 
instruments are armies and police forces. In stable nations group members, or 
citizens, submit themselves to governance that rests on such killing authority. If 
some primary groups are large enough to shift the burden of policing group threats 
from most of their members, the tradeoff is that violence occurs on a far more 
destructive scale when it does happen. While liberal philosophy treats violence as a 
failure of morality and imagination that, remedied, would produce peace, it does 
not address how to organize generationally persisting primary groups absent a 
capacity to assert their existential interests with force internally and externally. 
If religion is no stranger to violence, it shares this characteristic with 
nationalism, the distinctive group faith of modernity. Although Cavanaugh rightly 
questions the stereotype of confessional groups as the principal global perpetrators 
of violence, primary enduring groups that are confessional do sometimes organize 
and mobilize killing energies as a measure of their devotional commitment. 
Multigenerational groups have quite likely organized such energies at some time in 
their histories, or else accepted protection from groups that do. As Cavanaugh’s 
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useful survey of the historiography of the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries shows, national and confessional grievances are easily 
conflated. This is not because religion poorly describes human devotional 
practices, or because national and faith traditions are structurally distinct on this 
dimension. It is because national and faith traditions emerged as dominant social 
formations at different historical moments. That national and faith traditions are 
structurally similar is exactly why they so easily combine and compete with one 
another. 
I have argued that this reading allows us to frame the separation of church 
and state in the United States as a long-time barrier to confessional appropriations 
of the sacrificial authority that underlies nation-state authority and power. A wall 
of separation authorizes citizens under the protection of the nation-state to believe 
anything they wish in return for their consent not to kill in the name of what they 
believe, nor to compel the sacrifice of believers or of non-believers to confessional 
ends. Any violation will cause the state to intervene and jealously assert its own 
sacrificial authority as it did in 1993 in the case of David Koresh and his followers 
in Waco, and against nineteenth-century Mormons who also attempted to usurp 
nation-state killing authority, the so-called state of exception.  
Church-state separation is not the only pattern, of course. A second is state-
sponsored churches (the pattern of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Thailand 
among others). State-sponsored churches embrace the principle of national killing 
authority and are thereby defanged. This is equivalent in effect to the U.S. pattern.  
Still another pattern is Lebanon, which distributes top state offices among 
competing religious factions. A fourth pattern is that a religious entity morally 
authorizes state power and may assist in exercising it, as in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Somewhat similar is the Jewish state of Israel, where the state claims legal 
primacy but where the advice of faith is energetically acknowledged, courted (by 
some administrations more than others), and called upon to justify national ends, 
indeed, conflated with them on occasion. 
American Exceptionalism 
We are back to the mechanics of enduring groups. Where state and 
individual interests structurally conflict, how can individuals be convinced to 
sacrifice themselves for the cause? 
Durkheim metaphorized the powerful mechanisms of cooperation that 
persisting groups require in the concept of the totem. He frankly acknowledged 
that the constant production of friction within families, political clans, cities, and 
nations require powerful ritual mechanisms to periodically restore a sense of 
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collective commitment. He did not examine violence as a necessary instrument of 
group solidarity and a threat to it. He spoke of the totem taboo, the symbolic 
embodiment of altruistic cooperation, about which, as a sign of devotion, members 
agree not to disagree. As it relates to violence, the totem taboo may be reconceived 
as the tacit but impossible-to-acknowledge agreement that group members must be 
sacrificed for the group to survive. This mobilization directs the killing energies of 
nations and religious groups away from and toward a larger external threat. It is 
this transformation of disruptive killing energy into group devotion instantiated in 
sacrifice that channels aggression away from the group and toward group enemies.  
To mobilize believers, origin myths charter and authorize the tribe (religious 
or national) as the most righteous of groups. In the United States, this idea is 
contained in the myth of American exceptionalism and justified by a sacred history 
of conquest in the name of freedom. Doctrinally, persons are made fully human by 
the freedom (a spiritual quality in this vocabulary) they are permitted to exercise. 
Advancing freedom is a mission that gives meaning and cosmological purpose to 
lives sacrificed on behalf of the group. These meanings are elaborated in sacred 
symbols and rituals that are easily recognized as religious in character and tone. In 
the United States, the flag is the most emotionally potent totem of group identity 
and ritual activity. It is endowed with sacred liveness, and rhetorically and 
mythically cast as an agent that gathers the martyred fallen to itself. The archetypal 
extension of the origin myth tells of soldiers who exchange their own lives to  
preserve the flag and, by this means, the tribe it embodies.   
Among eusocial groups generally and nation-states in particular, devotion to 
an all-powerful group idea can stimulate an altruistic shared commitment among 
group members that trumps the calculus of individual self interest and creates a 
moral obligation to serve the group imperative—whether for those who sacrifice 
themselves or those who love and offer them without complaint.
26
 From this 
perspective, nationalism can be rightly understood as the characteristic religion of 
modernity, doctrinally and emotionally suited to modern believers for whom the 
great traditional religions of axial age invention no longer command levels of self-
sacrificing devotion. 
Be that as it may, devoted nationalists often insist that patriotism is secular 
and not like religion at all. But this makes sense. Countenancing overt equivalence 
between patriotism and religion would render confessional faith entitled, 
                                                          
26 The ritual obverse of sacrifice is fertility, which encompasses the sexual and fertile dimension of group 
cooperation that is its positive, furnishing side, where connections and unions among group members enlarge the 
group and make it materially and spiritually dense, the obverse of sacrifice, which separates members from the 
group. 
15 
 
theoretically at least, to exercise the privilege of killing authority. This challenges 
the self-described right of the nation-state to elevate its own killing power above 
that of religion which, in its own origin myth, it succeeds and replaces. By denying 
the religious character of patriotic devotion, contrary to its rhetoric and ritual form, 
the nation cements its monopoly on the command of sacrificial violence and keeps 
sectarian competitors for the loyalty of citizens at bay.   
 Can enduring groups fail? When the contemporary adaptations of an origin 
myth are no longer compelling to followers, belief in its protective powers and in 
the sacrificial obligation it enshrines will be at risk. Sooner or later, the group must 
disband, or be absorbed by, or seek the protection of, those with more urgent and 
convincing myths. While a more or less unified ideology is no guarantee of group 
dominance, willingness to compete cannot long be sustained in its absence. Not 
every member of the group need agree with every other about every point, or even 
with majority opinion. What is needed at times of collective threat is that everyone 
knows the obligations of tribal commitment and can persuade themselves of the 
necessity of group response. 
This does not mean that dissent is meaningless, especially when a group is 
set to launch some calamity to its prospects for survival, or violate human rights 
that are felt to morally constrain  both our own and other group members. Nor does 
it mean that dissent is never successful. But we engage with extraordinarily 
powerful group sentiments whenever nations contemplate sacrificing the flower of 
their youth, or Abraham gets ready to murder Isaac, when citizens protest 
repressive governments in the Arab spring, the Cultural Revolution roots out the 
wavering and even, on a milder level, when universities deny tenure to non-
performing assistant professors in their competition for academic prestige, 
acquisition of resources, and the recruitment of new and talented members.  
Though social death is not physical death, it remains a powerful expression of 
group dynamics and may be traumatic or life transforming in its way. 
Nor can the moral dilemmas of sacrifice be wished away by relying on the 
wisdom and benevolence of democratic regimes. In the competition for 
dominance, force is a resource for all enduring groups, including democratic ones. 
Amartya Sen and his followers have argued that democratic groups are better able 
to debate what counts as a threat and the level of volition or coercion to be 
exercised in response because they are morally and procedurally bound to seek the 
expressed approval of majorities.
 27
 Democratic regimes may sometimes be able to 
debate more fully what counts as a threat, who threatens, and the level of sacrifice 
                                                          
27
 Amartya Sen & J.H. Dreze, “Democracy as a Universal Value” in Journal of Democracy vol. 10, 3 1999B, 3-17.   
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to be exercised in response to threat. But the structural incommensurability of 
individual and group interests (never mind the welfare of non-believing others, 
those propagandized useful enemies) haunts all ideological colorings and every 
claim of democracy to liberate individuals. 
To conclude: confessionalism and patriotism are different ways of binding 
multigenerational enduring groups. Both must answer to the moral paradox of 
group survival in which some members are sacrificed to save others. This is the 
fundamental moral challenge of group life. Are human groups doomed, therefore, 
to violently compete? The profane world will, of course, always be ours to live in. 
If past times were saturated with religiopolitical dilemmas, present times are no 
less fraught. Though it is futile to imagine that violence can entirely disappear 
from human affairs, our understanding of how it holds us in thrall may make us 
more humble in managing it. In that hope is meaning itself and, in the various ways 
we construe it, religion as we practice it in the world. 
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